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INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects employees’
right to engage in activities necessary to vindicate their right to
collectively bargain. This includes the rights of unions to truthfully
inform the public about an employer’s activities and to deploy
organizers to inform workers of their right to organize. Neither the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) nor the Supreme Court has
read the NLRA as giving an advantage to employees over employers
within the potentially adversarial union organizing process.
Accordingly, employers’ entrepreneurial and property rights,
particularly state property rights, limit the scope of rights granted by
the NLRA. At the same time, two doctrines of federal labor law’s
preemption of state law, termed Garmon and Machinists preemption,
circumscribe the ability of state legislatures and courts to interfere in
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Congress’ comprehensive regulatory scheme over industrial
employment relations.
In Roundy’s Inc. v. NLRB, the Seventh Circuit correctly enforced a
NLRB charge against a supermarket employer who excluded
nonemployee union organizers from property near its stores, property
over which the company held an easement but did not own. The
organizers were engaged in truthful informational leafleting about the
employer’s labor practices. In enforcing the order, the court, relying
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lechmere v. NLRB, considered
whether the employer’s easement, granted by its lessor, gave it a
“power to exclude” the organizers, and took up, though ultimately
rejected, the employer’s defense based on statutory and common law
grants of authority to easement holders.
This inquiry was unnecessary because the NLRA should preempt
any such defense. The Seventh Circuit missed an opportunity to clarify
the purpose and operation of the NLRA’s grant of rights to
nonemployee organizers: if the employer cannot claim a trespass, the
organizers may not be excluded so long as they are otherwise acting
lawfully; and any state grant of authority to the contrary should be
preempted by the NLRA under Machinists preemption.
This Comment will support that contention over the next four
sections. First, Section I will discuss the facts and outcome of the
Seventh Circuit case, Roundy’s Inc. v. NLRB, in which the court
considered an employer’s appeal of an NLRB charge of violating §
8(a)(1) of the NLRA. Next, Section II will trace the development of
the jurisprudence surrounding employees’ and nonemployees’ § 7
rights and exclusion from property. In Section III, the Garmon and
Machinists preemption doctrines are taken up, looking ultimately at
the Supreme Court’s holding in Chamber of Commerce of the United
States v. Brown, striking down a California statute that impermissibly
interfered with Congress’ scheme of keeping employer and employee
speech a “free zone” for the interplay of opposing forces. Finally,
Section IV draws on the analysis and discussion in the preceding
sections and argues that no state statute or common law rule could
grant easement-holding employers a right to exclude otherwise lawful
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§ 7 hand-billers or organizers because of the preemption doctrines and
Lechmere’s limited concern with trespass.
I. THE CASE OVERVIEW: ROUNDY’S V. NLRB
A. Background
Roundy’s, Inc. operates more than two-dozen groceries1 in
southeastern Wisconsin under the name Pick’n Save. In the spring of
2005, the Milwaukee Construction and Trades Council (“the Union”),
an association of construction workers union locals, deployed
organizers to these Pick’n Save stores to distribute leaflets to
consumers, urging them to boycott the stores in protest of Roundy’s
failure to retain union contractors or pay prevailing union wages to
workers constructing and remodeling their stores.2 The hand-billers
were not attempting to organize Pick’n Save employees into a union—
they were already unionized—nor were they attempting to discourage
nonunion construction workers from crossing a picket line, 3 two
relevant inquiries under the NLRA.4 Instead, the leafleting was
1

See Pick’n Save Store Locator, http://www.picknsave.com/StoreLocator.aspx
(last visited 10 June, 2013).
2
Roundy's Inc., Respondent & Milwaukee Bldg. & Constr. Council, Afl-Cio,
Charging Party, CASE 30-CA-17185, 2006 WL 325760 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges
Feb. 8, 2006).
3
Id. (“Let me begin by stating what this case does and does not involve. It does
not involve organizing activities, either by employees or non-employee union
representatives. And it does not involve a bargaining dispute between unionrepresented employees and their employer. It deals with nonemployee union
representatives publicizing a dispute between a union and an employer over using
contractors, in the construction or remodeling of its stores, who do not adhere to area
wage standards.”).
4
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act protects the rights of employees
of employers engaged in interstate commerce to engage in “concerted activity” for
the purpose of “mutual aid and protection.” Truthfully informing the public about an
employer’s labor current relations and outreach to employees by nonemployee union
organizers are considered protected by § 7 as derivative rights. For the purposes of
this comment, protected § 7 activity, including handbilling and communication with
employees (but excluding more technical areas such as “recognitional picketing,”
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intended to pressure Roundy’s to require union contractors be used for
its stores, or to require prevailing wages be paid to its nonunion
contractors.5 This type of organizing activity is protected by the
NLRA and the legal analysis is the same as if the organizing activity
was for the purposes of organizing a new union.6 Roundy’s leases all
but one of its Milwaukee-area locations,7 many of which are situated
in shopping strips,8 and had therefore initially claimed that they did
not have control over contracting decisions.9 However, in his findings,
the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that Roundy’s retained
authority to insist on lower cost labor through the terms of their lease
agreements.10
Roundy’s management responded to the handbilling effort by
having supervisors and managers order the organizers off the property,
or have the police called to eject them. The Council filed an unfair
labor practice (“ULP”) charge with the National Labor Relations
Board, specifically alleging that the Union’s rights under § 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) to engage in organizing
activity was unlawfully infringed, in part because Roundy’s lacked the
requisite property interest to exclude the organizers from the
property.11 The Union alleged that § 8(a)(1) of the Act12 was violated
as a result of the unlawful exclusion.
etc.) is referred to “organizing activity.” See e.g., J.E. Macy, Annotation, Rights of
Collective Action by Employees as Declared in § 7 of National Labor Relations Act
(29 USCA § 157), 6 A.L.R.2d 416 (1949) (“Employer who promulgated and
discriminatorily enforced no-solicitation rule barring nonemployee union organizers
from meeting with off-duty credit center employees in cafeteria, and who threatened
police action and engaged in unwarranted surveillance of protected union activities,
violated employees' rights…”).
5
Roundy's Inc., 2006 WL 325760.
6
See infra note 13.
7
Roundy's Inc., 2006 WL 325760.
8
Id. (“At some of the locations, Respondent's store was in a shopping mall and
in others the store was free standing.”).
9
Id.
10
Id..
11
Roundy’s Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 674 F.3d 638, 643 (7th
Cir.2012).
12
National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
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Where employee or nonemployee union organizers are excluded
from private property, the NLRB and federal courts consider as a
threshold issue whether the employer in fact had a property right
sufficient to exclude people from the premises.13 If the employer
lacked a property interest sufficient to exclude parties, that exclusion
would infringe protected § 7 organizing-like activities, and thus violate
§ 8(a)(1) of the Act. Only the property and entrepreneurial rights of
the employer limit the protections of the NLRA, the federal law
governing labor relations. So for example, a sole tenant in a shopping
mall who evicts nonemployee organizers leafleting on a sidewalk
abutting the street (which they do not own) would presumably not
have a property interest in the sidewalk differentiated from that of the
general public, and thus would lack an exclusionary property right.14
Their eviction of organizers would violate § 8(a)(1).15
In the Roundy’s case, the NLRB, after two rounds of fact finding
by an ALJ, found that the language of Roundy’s leases did not grant
the stores easements sufficient to exclude parties from common areas,
such as parking lots and sidewalks. Therefore, the Board found that
the exclusions of the handbilling organizers infringed on the Union’s §
7 rights and violated § 8(a)(1).16 Roundy’s appealed the Board’s
decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.17
The court considered a number of issues raised on appeal,
including whether the Board’s remanding to the ALJ for more factfinding on the property interest was appropriate considering the
Board’s General Counsel had failed to properly raise the property
interest issue; whether a legal authority on Wisconsin state property
law was an appropriate “expert” under the Federal Rules of Evidence
and Board precedent; and whether, as a substantive matter, Roundy’s
easements, created by the language of the lease and interpreted by
13

Lechmere Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 535 (Year) (reiterating that “in
practice, nonemployee organizational trespassing had generally been prohibited…”).
14
Id.
15
The jurisprudence underlying this doctrine is discussed more fully in Section
III; see discussion infra Section III.
16
Roundy’s Inc., 674 F.3d at 643.
17
Id.
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state common law, conferred a sufficient property interest to exclude
the organizers.18
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis.
Roundy’s ultimately failed to allege a sufficient property interest
to exclude the organizers under a combination of state common and
positive law. This was because Roundy’s easement, granted through a
lease, did not give Roundy’s an interest sufficient to exclude parties
from those easements. Had Wisconsin courts been more charitable to
easement holders—or had the Wisconsin legislature positively granted
easement holders a cause of action for trespass even absent a fee
simple—the case may have gone the other way. The problem lies
therein.
The Board, an administrative agency created by the NLRA, is
entrusted with interpreting the Act and is entitled to appropriate
judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.19 However, where the Board must interpret and apply state
law to arrive at a decision, that analysis is subject to review de novo.20
In reviewing the Board’s decision in this case, the court acknowledged
that in leafleting exclusion and organizing activity cases a union may
prevail on either (a) a disparate treatment theory or (b) on the grounds
that the employer lacked a sufficient property interest to exclude.21
In disparate treatment cases, the Board or a reviewing court will
consider whether the employer treated union activity differently from
other analogous activities—such as political or charitable speech—that
are permitted.22 This analysis is unnecessary, however, where the
excluding party lacks an initial right to exclude; it is thus a threshold
18

Id.
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
20
Roundy’s Inc., 674 F.3d at 646 (citing United Food & Commercial Workers
Int’l Union Local 400 v. NLRB, 222 F.3d 1030, 1035 (D.C.Cir.2000) (reviewing de
novo Board's determination of whether employer had sufficient property interest to
exclude union organizers because Board has no special expertise in interpreting
Virginia law).
21
Id. at 645.
22
Id. at 644-45.
19
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issue.23 Determining the nature of a party’s property interest is a
matter of state property law, and is often common law, an area in
which the Board lacks “special expertise.”24 In such cases, the
reviewing court is charged with trying to determine how a state
supreme court—in this instance the Wisconsin Supreme Court—
would rule on the issue. In Roundy’s, state property law defined the
rights of easement-holders using this analysis.25
To determine whether Roundy’s had a property interest sufficient
to exclude anyone from the common areas where the hand-billers
stood, the court looked first to the language of the leases to determine
the type of easements26 granted to Roundy’s by the property owner.
The use of the terms “easement” and “lease” may be confusing, so a
brief explication may be helpful. Roundy’s, like many retail
employers, particularly in suburban settings, does not own all of the
property in which their store is situated—they lease a building only.
However, the lessor (the property owner) grants them an “easement”
in the language of their lease. This easement permits their use of the
parking lot, berms, loading areas, etc. They need this easement so that
their licensees and invitees—their customers primarily—can access
the building. But they do not own these portions of the property; they
simply have an easement for its use, along with the other tenants and
the property owner.27 Easements should be understood as a right to use
23

Id.
Id. at 646.
25
Id. at 655 (citing to Blood v. VH-1 Music First, 688 F.3d 543, 546-47 (7th
Cir.2012)).
26
The Board’s and court’s focus on easements is of particular importance in
this case. Easements are flexible and can confer on the recipient a wide variety of
property interests, not necessarily inclusionary: “An easement is a property interest
that grants a nonexclusive right or privilege to possess or make use of someone else's
lands. It may be obtained by contractual grant, by factual or legal implication from
the intention of the parties or other circumstances of the transaction, or by an adverse
use during a statutorily prescribed period.” See, e.g., James L. Buchwalter,
Annotation, What Constitutes, and Remedies for, Misuse of Easement, 111
A.L.R.5th 313 (2003).
27
The court reproduced the language found in the majority of leases in
question: “Tenant is hereby granted a nonexclusive easement, right and privilege for
itself and its customers, employees and invitees and the customers, employees and
24
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property that is not otherwise owned, and the nature of the use is
determined by the terms used in the language of the easement and state
law.
The court adopted the details of Roundy’s easements in leases as
found by the ALJ.28 While they differed in some details, the easements
were essentially nonexclusive easements that “generally permit use of
the common areas by [Roundy’s] and its customers, employees and
invitees, as well as the landlord and other tenants of the shopping
centers, and their customers, employees and invitees.”29 The right to
permit use of common areas is obviously not coextensive with a right
to exclude.30 This limitation/fact can be inferred from the language of
invitees of any subtenant, concessionaire or licensee of Tenant to use the [common
areas] without charge with Landlord and other tenants and occupants of the
Shopping Center and their customers, employees and invitees; provided, however,
no use of the [common areas] shall be made which detracts from the first-class
nature of the Shopping Center or obstructs access to or parking provided for
customers of the Shopping Center.” Roundy’s Inc., 674 F.3d at 643.
28
Roundy's Inc., Respondent & Milwaukee Bldg. & Constr. Council, Afl-Cio,
Charging Party, 30-CA-17185R, 2007 WL 966762 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Mar.
28, 2007) (“[Twenty-five of the 26 store] locations were subject to different lease
agreements between different landlords and Respondent, which leased the stores
themselves, not the common areas in front of the stores, where the handbilling took
place. The details of the relevant language of the lease agreements are set forth in a
stipulation of the parties during the remand hearing (Jt. Exh. 4). Although the parties
differ on whether the Respondent has an exclusionary interest in the common areas
where the handbilling took place, there is essential agreement that Respondent had a
nonexclusive easement in those common areas. Most of the leases specifically
provide that the lessee has a nonexclusive easement in the common areas, including
the sidewalks immediately in front of the stores and the parking lots serving the
leased premises, and the others implicitly provide as much. The Respondent
concedes (Opening brief on remand, at 2 and 37-39) that the leases at all 25 leased
locations granted it “non-exclusive easements to the common areas.” The easements
generally permit use of the common areas by Respondent and its customers,
employees and invitees, as well as the landlord and other tenants of the shopping
centers, and their customers, employees and invitees.”).
29
Id.
30
Roundy's Inc., 674 F.3d at 651 (quoting Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v.
Jackson Cnty., 785 N.W.2d 615, 621 (2010)) (“An easement creates a nonpossessory
right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor
not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.”).
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the easements; if Roundy’s had a right to exclude of the type imputed
to full property rights, Roundy’s could feasibly exclude the customers
of other tenants from sidewalks and the parking lot, and by the
language of the easement this plainly could not be the case. This is
what is meant by the term “nonexclusive”; where the easement holder
does not have an absolute right to exclude third parties from the
easement.
While the Seventh Circuit looked at how other courts of appeals
had treated nonexclusive easements in similar cases,31 Supreme Court
precedent from Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB required the court to look at
the particular state’s interpretation of property rights.32 Relying on
several cases from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit
ultimately determined that the language of the easements did not
confer on Roundy’s a right to exclude from common areas,33 and thus
violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act.34
In so doing, the court took up Roundy’s defense that a Wisconsin
statute, §§ 844.01 et seq., gave them a cause of action where their
property interest, including that in an easement, had been injured
through some type of interference.35 While the court rejected this
argument, it failed to address whether such a statute—or, indeed, the
state supreme court cases construing the exclusionary interests of
easement-holders—would be applicable anyway given doctrines of
preemption of federal labor law over state regulations and causes of
action, known as Garmon and Machinists preemption.36

31

Id.
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 535 (1992).
33
Roundy's Inc., 674 F.3d at 652.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Fed. Lab. Law: NLRB Prac. § 3:4 (“[M]ost courts divide the preemption
doctrine along a bright line, articulating two distinct NLRA preemption principles.
The first, the so-called Garmon preemption, prohibits states from regulating activity
that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits….The second
preemption principle, the so-called Machinists preemption, precludes state and
municipal regulation concerning conduct that Congress intended to be
unregulated.”).
32

467
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

9

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 9

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 2

Spring 2013

Instead, the court focused on the substantive deficiency of the
relied-upon statute. The court stated that the statute did not create an
independent cause of action granting a right, but only a remedy where
a sufficient right existed (presumably by the express terms of the lease
and easement).37 The court thus rejected the employer’s proffered
defense, saying, “Section 844.01(1)…doesn't create an independent
cause of action; it is a remedial and procedural statute that sets forth
the remedies available when a cause of action exists…. In other words,
Section 844.01 only provides remedies for persons who are injured as
a result of an interference with their interests in real property.”38 The
court then looked to whether, under Wisconsin state law, Roundy’s
had suffered an “unreasonable interference” with their easement:
“Because Roundy's has rights to the extent of its nonexclusive use in
the easements, it can enjoin third parties when they unreasonably
interfere with this use.”39 After looking at how other circuit courts had
treated the question, the court returned to Wisconsin state law and
determined that, given the ALJ’s findings that the hand-billers were
peacefully engaged in their activity in a way not obstructive to
Roundy’s business operations, they were “not unreasonably
interfering with Roundy’s use and enjoyment of its easement.”40 The
exclusion of the hand-billers thus interfered with the Union’s § 7
rights and violated § 8(a)(1). The court enforced the Board’s order
prohibiting future exclusions and requiring posting notices of the
violation.41
The court’s analysis reflects the drift of jurisprudence controlling
employer property rights and workers’ organizing rights under the
NLRA. By drifting with that post-Lechmere jurisprudence, the court
missed an opportunity to rectify the problem by considering how
37

Roundy’s Inc., 674 F.3d at 652.
Id. (citing Menick v. City of Menasha, 200 Wis.2d 737, 547 N.W.2d 778,
782 (Wis.Ct.App.1996); Shanak v. City of Waupaca, 518 N.W.2d 310, 320
(Wis.Ct.App.1994) (stating that Section 844.01 “creates no rights or duties. It does
not purport to create a cause of action. It is a remedial and procedural statute.”)).
39
Id. at 653(citing Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis.2d 338, 254 N.W.2d 282, 285
(1977)).
40
Id. at 654-55.
41
Id.
38
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federal preemption doctrines could come into play in these scenarios.
The following section traces the Lechmere genealogy, before a
consideration of federal labor law preemption.
II. LECHMERE’S GENESIS AND SUBSEQUENT DRIFT
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) regulates employee
organizing activity.42 These organizing rights are at the heart of the
NLRA and are referred to metonymically as § 7 rights. They were
originally conceived to encourage unionization and collective
bargaining through organizing activities, and to ensure that employers
could not unduly interfere with that process. Since its passage in 1935,
interpretation of the NLRA has evolved and it is not currently
construed as favoring one party over another.43 Employee and
nonemployee organizers’ rights to physically access employees are
based on state, not federal, law because state law defines “property”.44
Thus, where federal rights interact with property rights, state
definitions of property law will be employed.
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Supreme Court
determined that a state may “exercise its police power or its sovereign
right to adopt in its own constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.”45 The
Supreme Court in PruneYard held that state law defines a defendant’s
property rights in an expressive activity case.46 The Court affirmed
42

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1935).
Chicago labor lawyer Thomas Geoghegan shares an anecdote of a young
attorney who applied for a job with the NLRB; when the attorney questioned which
side the Board was on in the struggle between employers and employees, the
interviewer said, “We’re neutral…but we’re neutral on the side of the workers.”
THOMAS GEOHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 265-66 (1991).
44
See e.g., New York New York Hotel, 334 NLRB 761 (2001).
45
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (On the
interaction of property rights and First Amendment protected speech).
46
Id. (“Nor as a general proposition is the United States, as opposed to the
several States, possessed of residual authority that enables it to define ‘property’ in
the first instance.”).
43
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and explicated this principle in the labor context in Thunder Basin
Coal Co. v. Reich in note 21, stating “[t]he right of employers to
exclude union organizers from their private property emanate[s] from
state common law, and while this right is not superseded by the
NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly protects it.”47
The Court struggled with how the Act’s creation and guarantee of
organizing rights for workers and unions interacted with an
employer’s property rights. There seemed to be an intractable
contradiction: the very nature of workers’ rights to organize one
another, discuss unionization, and appeal to the public and other
workers to recognize labor disputes requires some interference, if not
outright use, of the employer’s property; at the same time, a federal
statute that seriously burdened employers’ property rights would
implicate any number of constitutional issues. Beginning with
Republic Aviation v. N.L.R.B., through Babcock & Wilcox v. N.L.R.B.,
Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., and culminating in Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,
the Court moved along a gentle slope from recognizing that the
employees’ organizing rights necessarily limited an employer’s
property rights, to giving preference to those property rights in large
categories of cases.
A. Analogy to First Amendment
One strain of the jurisprudence, rooted in First Amendment
free speech rights, started strong but fizzled out. In Marsh v. Alabama,
the Court held that a company-owned town could not prohibit
Jehovah’s Witnesses from proselytizing on a property-rights theory.48
The Court rejected the contention that property rights granted
“absolute dominion” to curtail First Amendment rights.49 This was
particularly the case where the private property had first been opened
to the public and First Amendment expression successively curtailed.50
The Court extended this theory to the labor rights context in
47

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 217, n. 21 ((1994)).
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
49
Id.
50
Id.
48
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Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc.51 The Court expressed a policy concern that businesses
migrating to strip malls and business parks in suburban contexts
“could largely immunize themselves from similar criticism by creating
a cordon sanitaire of parking lots around their stores,” if employers
could rely on property rights to curtail the First Amendment
expression necessarily entailed in § 7 organizational rights.52 The
Court applied the reasoning of Marsh, that given the essentially public
nature of a shopping center, no meaningful privacy-sourced concern
over property rights could justify exclusion.53
The progress made on a constitutional theory wedding, or at
least analogizing, § 7 rights to free speech began to ebb back down the
slope with the Court’s decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner. Lloyd was a
Vietnam protest case where the Court distinguished Logan Valley and
Marsh on the grounds that anti-war speech was unrelated to the nature
of the property (a shopping mall), and thus courts should not force
property owners to tolerate the speech.54 Subsequently, in Hudgens v.
NLRB,55 the Court short-circuited any further expansion of Logan
Valley into the labor context: “[T]he rationale of Logan Valley did not
survive the Court's decision in the Lloyd case.”56 Union protesters
could not enter a shopping mall for the purpose of advertising their
strike against one tenant.57 Logan Valley having conclusively
smothered any First Amendment free speech theory for § 7 rights, the
expression of those rights is analyzed under its own labor law rubric.

51

Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968).
52
Id.
53
Id.; see also Catherine Lockard, Note, Gaining Access to Private Property:
The Zoning Process and Development Agreements, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765,
775-76 (2003).
54
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
55
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
56
Id. at 518.
57
Id. at 520-21.
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B. Republic Aviation Through Lechmere
Outside this truncated thread of cases, the Court otherwise treated
the question of employee and nonemployee organizer access to or use
of employer property within a narrower labor law context, eschewing
any free speech analysis. In Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B.,58 the
Court enforced a Board order invalidating the employer’s blanket
prohibition against any solicitation as violative of employees’ § 7
rights, even though the prohibition was not discriminatorily applied.59
In its essence, the Court’s holding created an employer duty to
accommodate employees’ protected § 7 activity even on its own
property.
This duty would not encompass too much, however. In 1956, the
Court decided N.L.R.B. v. The Babcock & Wilcox Company, holding
that an employer had no duty to permit nonemployee organizers to
access its (wholly owned) parking lots for purposes of § 7 activities,
where the plant was near to small communities where employees
lived, and thus many other means of publicity and organizing were
available.60 A non-discriminatory policy against access by
nonemployee organizers in particular was therefore enforceable. The
Court in dictum stated that, “Organization rights are granted to
workers by the same authority, the National Government, that
preserves property rights. Accommodation between the two must be
obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the
maintenance of the other. The employer may not affirmatively
interfere with organization; the union may not always insist that the
employer aid organization.”61 The effect of Babcock was that the
NLRA would not create a duty on the employer to accommodate
nonemployee organizers’ organizing activities (i.e., “aid[ing]
organization”) if the union has any other options for contacting
employees.

58

Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
Id.
60
N.L.R.B. v. The Babcock & Wilcox Company, 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
61
Id. at 112.
59
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Of course, later Courts would locate the source of property rights
in the states, not the “National Government.” While differentiating
between employee and nonemployee organizers and explicating the
property rights of employers vis a vis § 7 rights, the Court reiterated
that § 7 rights are important enough that they must trump at least one
element of an employer’s property rights: “when the inaccessibility of
employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by
nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels,
the right to exclude from property has been required to yield to the
extent needed to permit communication of information on the right to
organize.”62 This caveat/exception is important because it confounds
the idea that employer property rights are absolutely sacrosanct—or
that § 7 rights are inherently inferior to those property rights.
Hudgens, discussed supra, was decided subsequent to Babcock and
explicated the general rule that employers’ rights to exclude trumped
nonemployees’ § 7 organizing rights.63 Thus situated, some deeper
discussion of Hudgens is appropriate. Also a shopping center case,
employees of a retailer in a shopping mall entered the mall to picket in
support of an economic strike. They were threatened with arrest if they
did not disperse. The union filed a complaint with the Board alleging
abridgment of § 7 rights and a violation of § 8(a)(1). The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals enforced the Board’s subsequent cease-and-desist
order. The Supreme Court reversed that order, on the grounds that the
shopping mall owner (the Petitioner, Scott Hudgens) was under no
duty to accommodate the striking workers. Hudgens’ primary effect
was to cleave access/accommodation cases under the NLRA from any
First Amendment constitutional analysis.64 The bulk of the opinion is
62

Id.
It may be helpful to think of nonemployee organizers § 7 rights as rights
derived from employees’ organizational rights under § 7—i.e., as derivative rights. It
is often union organizers who inform employees of their rights under the Act and aid
them in organizing their workplace and therefore if nonemployee organizers do not
have these “derivative” rights, employees would be unable in many cases to
effectively exercise their own organizational rights.
64
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 512-521 (1976) (“While acknowledging
that the source of the pickets' rights was s 7 of the Act, the Court of Appeals held
that the competing constitutional and property right considerations discussed in
63
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directed at that issue. It also however reinforced the Babcock
distinction between employees and nonemployees and reiterated that
accommodation was only to be an undesirable recourse where the
union did not have a means of access, stating that “[t]he Babcock &
Wilcox opinion established the basic objective under the Act.”65 In
what was later determined to be dicta, however, the Court restated at
least the premise for a balancing test between § 7 rights and
employers’ property rights, putting the “locus of that
accommodation…at differing points along the spectrum depending on
the nature and strength of the respective § 7 rights and private property
rights asserted in any given context.”66
The Board initially took this to be instruction to implement a
balancing test in cases of employee or nonemployee organizers
accessing employer property for protected § 7 activities. This idea
culminated in the Board’s decision in Jean Country.67 Jean Country,
like the Hudgens and Logan Valley cases discussed supra, dealt with a
shopping center, demonstrating just how important massive enclosures
of space and the concentration of various service-sector employers in
single locations has become to federal labor law jurisprudence.68 In
Jean Country, a union attempted to place an “informational picket,”
letting consumers know that a retailer, Jean Country, was non-union,
at the entrance to the store inside the mall.69 The store and mall
management contacted the police to remove the picketers.70 The Board
adopted the ALJ’s findings and applied a balancing test to determine
whether the removal of the picketers infringed on § 7 rights and thus

Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, supra, ‘burde(n) the General Counsel with the duty to prove
that other locations less intrusive upon Hudgens' property rights than picketing
inside the mall were either unavailable or ineffective,’ 501 F.2d, at 169, and that the
Board's General Counsel had met that burden in this case.”).
65
Hudgens, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1976).
66
Id.
67
Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
68
The importance of shopping centers also vindicates the Court’s concern in
Logan Valley.
69
Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 14-16.
70
Id. at 15.
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violated § 8(a)(1).71 The Board concluded on the basis of that
balancing test that the exclusion was unlawful:
Taking account of all the factors above, it is apparent that strict
maintenance of the privacy of the mall property during
business hours is not an overriding concern and in fact is not
generally desirable, because the presence of the public in large
numbers is intrinsic to the commercial goals of the lessees and
Respondent Brook. Accordingly, we find that the private
property right asserted by the Respondents in reaction to the
Union's picketing is quite weak in the circumstances.72
Jean Valley and balancing wouldn’t last long.
C. The Lechmere Decision
The Supreme Court finally had an opportunity to take on the
balancing test issue squarely in Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB.73 Lechmere
arose as a result of the United Food and Commercial Workers’
(“UFCW’s”) attempts to organize the employees of a retail
establishment in Connecticut.74 Finding it difficult to contact workers
by standing on a four-foot grass easement abutting a major arterial
road, organizers for the union leafleted employee cars (generally
identifiable by where and when they parked); in each instance,
management for the store removed the leaflets and ordered the
organizers to leave. The UFCW pursued a charge with the NLRB
alleging abridgement of § 7 rights.75 The Board applied the Jean
Country/Babcock balancing test and ruled in the union’s favor.76
Lechmere appealed, and the Court granted certiorari.77
71

Id. at 16 (“With the Respondents' interests established, we proceed to an
examination of the relative strength of their right to maintain the privacy of the
property.”).
72
Id. at 17.
73
Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
74
Id. at 529.
75
Id. at 529-30.
76
Id. at 531.
77
Id. at 531.
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Demonstrating just how much the details of property ownership
had crept into determinations of workers’ rights under the Act, the
Court described in great detail the physical characteristics of the
property on which the retailer was located.78 The Court rejected the
Board’s use of the Jean Country balancing test and created a rather
broad and simple categorical rule: an employer may exclude
nonemployee organizers from its property where the employer has a
property interest sufficient to exclude, and employees may be reached
by any other means.79
The Court in an opinion by Justice Thomas framed this rule as a
simple return to Babcock, relegating the “spectrum” language from
Hudgens to the dreaded dicta dustbin. The Court stiffened Babcock’s
general preference for employer property rights where any alternative
means of contact were available to nonemployee organizers, without
concern for the unworkability of employees’ § 7 rights absent
nonemployees’ derivative rights to organize them. However, Hudgens
did not stand for an eroding of Babcock; instead, in its disposition it
left Babcock’s central holding in place, reiterating that “Babcock's
language of ‘accommodation’ was [not] intended to repudiate or
modify [the] holding that an employer need not accommodate
nonemployee organizers unless the employees are otherwise
inaccessible.”80
78

Id. at 531 (“The store is located in the Lechmere Shopping Plaza, which
occupies a roughly rectangular tract measuring approximately 880 feet from north to
south and 740 feet from east to west. Lechmere's store is situated at the Plaza's south
end, with the main parking lot to its north. A strip of 13 smaller “satellite stores” not
owned by Lechmere runs along the west side of the Plaza, facing the parking lot. To
the Plaza's east (where the main entrance is located) runs the Berlin Turnpike, a fourlane divided highway. The parking lot, however, does not abut the Turnpike; they
are separated by a 46–foot–wide grassy strip, broken only by the Plaza's entrance.
Lechmere and the developer of the satellite stores own the parking lot jointly. The
grassy strip is public property (except for a 4-foot-wide band adjoining the parking
lot, which belongs to Lechmere).”).
79
Id. at 538 (Only in scenarios where, for example, employees were wholly
isolated or resided on property owned by the employer, as on remote oil rigs or
mining operations for example, would the Jean Country balancing test be
considered.).
80
Id. at 534.
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Lechmere created a stark categorical rule, one crafted in relief
against a darkly impermissible alternative: the federal government
compelling employers to suffer common law trespass. The Court cast
this categorical rule as a commonsensical result: absent such a rule, §
7 would otherwise be interpreted as suborning common law trespass.
That is, the Court’s reference to “reasonability” of accommodation in
earlier cases “was nothing more than a commonsense recognition that
unions need not engage in extraordinary feats to communicate with
inaccessible employees—not an endorsement of the view…. that the
Act protects ‘reasonable’ trespasses.”81 Whereas employee organizers
are the employer’s invitees or licensees, nonemployee organizers have
no such status. Thus, per Lechmere, a reading of § 7 requiring some
accommodation of employees’ activities would not unduly interfere
with state property rights. The categorical distinction was for the Court
an easy one to make; employees have a status under common law that
nonemployees do not, thus accommodation commensurate with that
status upsets nothing.
As Justices White and Blackmun pointed out in their dissent,
however, this seductive bit of argumentation falls flat upon closer
inspection of the facts, but at a slightly greater level of generality. That
is, whereas the parking lot involved in Babcock was for use
exclusively by employees and abutting a well-settled area,82 the
parking lot in Lechmere existed for the general public, “without
substantial limitation.”83
The analogy to trespass thus doesn’t survive when employed to
justify a categorical distinction between employees and
nonemployees; while nonemployees may seem out of place in a
parking lot otherwise used only by employees and the occasional
licensee, as in Babcock, in a parking lot that is open to the public
without any real limitation,84 nonemployees are perfectly expected, in
fact outright encouraged to be present?. They could hardly be
analogized to trespassers. What’s more, as the dissenting Justices
81

Id. at 537.
N.L.R.B. v. The Babcock & Wilcox Company, 351 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1956).
83
Lechmere Inc., 502 U.S. at 543 (White, J., dissenting).
84
E.g., there is no controlled access to the parking lot.
82
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pointed out, the employees’ § 7 rights often rely inextricably on
nonemployee organizers, as the Babcock decision itself points out.85
The Court’s categorical distinction between employees and
nonemployees86 and the faulty analogy to trespass has triggered a drift
in the jurisprudence that conflates employers’ state law-defined “right
to exclude” with employees’ § 7 organizational rights, giving
preference to the former even where the facts of a given case don’t
raise the specter of compelled trespass.
D. The Post-Lechmere Approach
The result of Lechmere on handbilling and similar organizing
activity cases has been to create a fairly simple formal inquiry: did the
employer have a property right, as defined by state law, to exclude? If
so, any exclusion of nonemployees is appropriate. If not, any
exclusion violates § 8(a)(1) of the Act (presuming otherwise lawful
behavior by the nonemployees).87 The employer’s right to exclude
therefore is not a right conferred by the NLRA itself. Instead, the right
as defined by state law defeats the § 7 rights of employees and the
derivative rights of nonemployee organizers.88
As the Roundy’s case shows, the inquiry may be simple in form,
but it can be complex in practice. The Board must interpret state
common law on property rights, not an area of expertise it has, and
reviewing courts must approximate how a state supreme court “would
85

Lechmere Inc., 502 U.S. at 543 (White, J. dissenting)(“Moreover, the Court
in Babcock recognized that actual communication with nonemployee organizers, not
mere notice that an organizing campaign exists, is necessary to vindicate § 7 rights.”)
(citing to Babcock, 351 U.S., at 113) (emphasis added).
86
Lechmere is often cited for its proposition that § 7 does not confer rights on
nonemployees, only employees (see e.g., Davis Country, Inc. v. NLRB 2 F.3d 1162
(D.C.Cir. 1993)). Because “employee” is a term defined by the NLRA, it is left to
the Board to interpret its meaning, see N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Electric, 516
U.S. 85 (1995) (holding that an employee simultaneously employed by a union is
still an employee for the purposes of the Act).
87
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law,
47 B.C.L.REV. 891, 905 (2006).
88
See e.g., Thunder Basin Coal v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 217, n. 21 (1994).
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decide” an issue.89 The result has been that employees seeking to
express their § 7 organizational rights are subject to the sometimes
nebulous—sometimes quirky—vagaries of state property law. A few
cases can demonstrate this odd drift away from the purpose of the
NLRA. That purpose is to comprehensively define and regulate
industrial relations and to protect rights of employees to organize. The
post-Lechmere jurisprudence has drifted towards allowing expression
of that purpose only where the employer must permit § 7 expression.
After Lechmere was handed down, reviewing courts had little
trouble disposing with organizer access cases.90 However, the
jurisprudence became more difficult when the property interest was
not clear. The Board and reviewing courts could not merely rely on
Lechmere because the right to exclude was not a NLRA right, but a
state common law right.91 So in cases involving an unclear property
interest, the Lechmere analysis turns on a reading of state property
law, which is inherently unstable for two reasons: first, because the
Board lacks expertise in state property law; and second, because
reviewing courts do not defer to the Board’s interpretation of state
property law, but must review the Board’s conclusion de novo. 92
States’ plenary authority to codify property rights by statute also raises
the possibility that state legislatures can alter the governing regimes
from time to time.93 Moreover, the fact that federal courts have a
89

Roundy’s Inc. v. NLRB, 674 F.3d 638 at 651 (7th Cir. 2012).
See e.g., Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 968 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1992); Frye
v. District 1199, Health Care and Social Services Union, Service Employees Intern.
Union, AFL-CIO, 996 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1993); N.L.R.B. v. Great Scot, Inc., 39
F.3d 678 (6th Cir.1994); Metropolitan Dist. Council of Philadelphia and Vicinity
United Broth. Of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 68 F.3d
71 (3rd Cir. 1995); Johnson & Hardin Co. v. N.L.R.B., 49 F.3d 237 (6th Cir.1995).
91
See e.g., Thunder Basin Coal v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994); N.L.R.B. v.
Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999).
92
Hirsch, supra note 87, at 906-07 (“The Board’s interpretation of a lease,
construction of a state’s treatment of public rights-of-way, or factual determination
of where the organizers were standing will either trigger Lechmere and make the
employer’s attempt to exclude lawful, or evade Lechmere and make the exact same
attempt unlawful. This analysis is frustrating for the parties, as they cannot
reasonably predict, ex ante, the Board’s determination of the state law issue.”).
93
See discussion infra Section III.
90
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historical doctrinal aversion to adjudicating land use cases in the first
place, diminishing their own expertise, aggravates the situation.94
Several cases illustrate the challenge for the Board and reviewing
courts created by Lechmere and its progeny.
In O’Neil’s Markets v. United Food and Commercial Workers’
Union, Meatcutters Local 88, AFL-CIO, CLC, the Eighth Circuit
declined to overturn a Board order finding that the employer, a grocer,
had violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act, subject to further proceedings on the
issue of the employer’s property interest.95 The employer in that case
had evicted “area-standards” hand-billers engaged in § 7 activities like
those of the hand-billers in Roundy’s.96 The O’Neil’s Markets court
began its analysis by looking to the language found in the lease
agreements.97 In its analysis, the court stalled its application of
Lechmere because of uncertainty as to whether that precedent could be
applied directly where the employer “does not own the parking lot or
sidewalk at issue.”98 Citing to a similar though less thoroughly
discussed case from the Sixth Circuit, the court inquired into the
precise nature of the employer’s property interest as defined by its
lease and interpreted by state courts.99
The analysis in O’Neil’s Markets is keen if a bit unwieldy. The
court stated that because per the terms of the lease the employer had a
“non-exclusive easement of ingress, egress, and parking,” more
94

See e.g., Note, Land Use Regulation, the Federal Courts, and the Abstention
Doctrine, 89 YALE L.J. 1134, 1135-36 (1980) (“Although the [Supreme] Court
reentered the land use field in the 1970s, its disposition of the recent cases has
tended to discourage federal land use litigation. The volume of land use litigation in
the lower federal courts has increased in recent years, but a variety of procedural and
substantive devices, including abstention, have been invoked to discourage land use
litigants from entering federal court.”); see also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1, 13 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (federal courts should not sit as “zoning
board[s] of appeal.”).
95
O’Neil’s Markets v. United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union,
Meatcutters Local 88, AFL-CIO, CLC, 95 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 1996).
96
Id. at 734-35.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 737.
99
Id. at 738-39 (citing to Johnson & Hardin Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 690, enf’d, 49
F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 1995).
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evidence or law would be needed for the employer to carry its
persuasive burden proving that it had a property interest sufficient to
exclude the hand-billers.100 Evidence offered by the employer that it
was responsible for maintenance of the common areas was insufficient
to create a property interest not otherwise explicit in the lease, at least
insofar as no case authority was offered to support that conclusion.101
Instead, the court looked to a contract interpretation case for the
proposition that in cases of ambiguity of interests conferred, only the
text of the lease could be relied upon.102 What’s more, Missouri
common law explicitly debarred “easement owners” from trespass
remedies,103 which impliedly conflicted with Lechmere’s particular
concern with suborned or “reasonable” trespass.104 The court therefore
remanded the case for further proceedings on whether the picketing
was truly protected activity with the presumption that if it were, the
Petitioner would be liable for a violation of § 8(a)(1).105
Obviously, different states ascribe different degrees of interest or
rights to easement holders. The Snyder’s of Hanover case106
demonstrates the quirkiness of this fact. In this unreported and
complex case out of the Third Circuit, the court reversed a Board
order107 finding that the employer Snyder’s of Hanover, a
Pennsylvania pretzel-maker, had violated § 8(a)(1) when it called
police to eject UFCW hand-billers from the public right-of-way at the
edge of its factory’s driveway.108 The route to that conclusion was a
circuitous one.

100

Id. at 739.
Id.
102
Id. (citing Washington Univ. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 801 S.W.2d 458,
464 (Mo.Ct.App.1990).
103
Id. at 739 (citing Gilbert v. K.T.I., Inc., 765 S.W.2d 289, 293
(Mo.Ct.App.1988).
104
See Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537 (1992).
105
O’Neil’s Markets, 95 F.3d at 740.
106
Snyder’s of Hanover v. N.L.R.B., 39 Fed.Appx. 730 (2002).
107
Snyder’s of Hanover, 334 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (2001).
108
Snyder’s of Hanover, 39 Fed.Appx. at 735.
101
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On October 1st, 1998,109 five union organizers stood at the “edge”
of the facility, on a right-of-way that ran “from the middle of [State
Route] 116 to a line running tangent to one utility pole near the
driveway and a short distance behind the other utility poles located
near the edge of the road.”110 The five organizers did not “venture
inside the utility poles,” thus (apparently) staying in the right-of-way,
from where they distributed leaflets to employees in their cars as they
drove onto and off of the factory’s premises.111 Hearing about the
union activity outside, company management confronted the
organizers and, finding none of them to be employees, asked them to
leave the property.112 When the organizers refused, police were called
and the organizers were ejected as trespassers.113 The UFCW filed a
complaint for violation of the NLRA with the Board; the Board
agreed, and the employer appealed.
The Third Circuit, reviewing the Board’s interpretation of
Pennsylvania property law de novo, reversed the Board. It held that the
Board misconstrued the presumption created by the law..114 In
Pennsylvania, property owners own up to the middle of abutting
roadways.115 The court stated that Pennsylvania law, although
“checkered,” conditioned a property owner’s rights over a right-ofway on what the given municipality itself permitted.116 In other words,
a property owner could exclude hand-billers, or other parties, if a
municipal ordinance barred that activity in rights-of-way, or could not
if that activity was expressly permitted by ordinance, but not
otherwise.117 Even further complicating matters, the case law indicated
that the interpretation of the type of expressive activity allowed could
109

The lag between the incident and a final decision in this case demonstrates
how uncertainty as to ultimate conclusions can delay remedy under the Act.
110
Snyder’s of Hanover, 39 Fed.Appx. at 731.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 731-32.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 732-33.
115
See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 46
A.2d 16, 20 (1946); City of Scranton v. People's Coal Co., 100 A. 818, 819 (1917).
116
Snyder’s of Hanover, 39 Fed.Appx. at 733.
117
Id. at 733-34.
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vary from an urban to a rural setting.118 The court ultimately resolved
the case on the proposition that the employer did not carry a burden of
proving precisely what the municipality permitted—stating that it was
a legal question, not a factual question requiring proving up, and the
Board had erred in requiring that burden.119
Notably, perhaps mercifully, the court declined to undertake a
constitutional first amendment analysis of the Pennsylvania law
granting municipalities this power to potentially exclude expressive
conduct.120 In any case, it goes without saying that this analysis is a
long way from the Lechmere Court’s concern with suborning trespass.
To the contrary; the court went to pains to err on the side of an
exclusionary interest in a right-of-way, a form of property that by its
very character is non-exclusive—and arguably of the type captured by
the so-called Hague dictum, that properties that “have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public,” should be considered as
bearing expressive conduct.121
The explicit and implicit power of state and local governments to
determine these property interests, federal courts’ doctrinal aversion to
adjudicating land use controls, and local governments’ powers to
confer rights or require exactions related to the uses of property only
further discommode the NLRA’s purpose of crisply and clearly
defining industrial relations.122 To understand how, however, a
treatment of NLRA preemption jurisprudence is necessary.
III. GARMON AND MACHINISTS PREEMPTION UNDER THE NLRA
Two species of preemption govern state and local government
actions vis a vis federal labor law.123 Garmon preemption invalidates
118

Id. at 734.
Id. (“The municipality's authorization or non-authorization of handbilling by
public ordinance is a legal issue, however, and not an issue of fact for which
Snyder's bore the burden of proof ….”) (citing to Gary E. Calkins d/b/a/ Indio
Grocery Outlet, 323 N.L.R.B. 1138 (1997)).
120
Id.
121
Id. (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
122
See discussion infra § IV.
123
See e.g., FED. LAB. LAW: NLRB PRAC. § 3:5.
119

483
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

25

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 9

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 2

Spring 2013

any state regulation of activity that the NLRA otherwise regulates
through prohibition or protection. The second, Machinists preemption,
precludes state regulations of industrial labor relations conduct that
Congress otherwise intended to keep unregulated.124 Generally, a state
or local law conflicts with federal legislation, including the NLRA, if
that law impedes or interferes with the execution of Congress’
objectives in creating the legislation.125
In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020
v. Garmon, the Court held that a California court had no jurisdiction to
award an employer damages for injuries caused by picketing and
related concerted activities on state common law tort grounds, even
where the Board had declined to extend its jurisdiction to the case.126
The Court held that Congress had, through positive legislation in the
form of the language of § 7 and the related enforcement provisions of
the NLRA, preempted such a cause of action in state courts, and to
hold otherwise would subvert the purpose and efficacy of a national
labor relations law rooted in interstate commerce.127
In Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFLCIO v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n (hereafter
Machinists), the employer filed a charge with the Board, claiming that
union members’ concerted refusal to work overtime as a tactic to force
renewal of an expired collective bargaining agreement violated the
NLRA as an unfair labor practice.128 The NLRB dismissed the claim,
which the employer then brought before the Wisconsin Employment
124

Id. at § 3:4.
See e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); St. Thomas-St. John
Hotel & Tourism Ass'n. Inc. v. Government of U.S. Virgin Islands ex rel. Virgin
Islands Dept. of Labor, 357 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2004).
126
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959) (the Board presumably declined jurisdiction because of the
minimal interaction with “interstate commerce.”).
127
Id. at 246 (“Since the National Labor Relations Board has not adjudicated
the status of the conduct for which the State of California seeks to give a remedy in
damages, and since such activity is arguably within the compass of s 7 or s 8 of the
Act, the State's jurisdiction is displaced.”).
128
Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
125
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Relations Commission, a state agency.129 The Commission, navigating
Garmon shoals, held that because a “concerted refusal to work
overtime” was neither expressly protected by § 7 nor expressly
prohibited by § 8, the Commission had jurisdiction to act on the claim,
which it did by issuing a cease-and-desist order to the union.130
The Court accepted an appeal from the Wisconsin Supreme Court
affirming the decision, and in its analysis laid out the general policy
considerations underlying preemption as, first, avoiding multifarious
pronouncement from different jurisdictions,131 and second, a concern
that state actions would circumscribe the expression of rights created
by the Act.132 The inquiry in Machinists turned on Congressional
intent, or more precisely, on Congress’ vision of the nature of labor
relations and bargaining. Specifically, where Congress envisioned
workers and employers using “economic weapons [the] actual exercise
(of which) on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system
that the [NLRA has] recognized,” a state regulation will be preempted
as regulating activity meant to be left to free interplay between
opposing forces.133 Concerted activity in the form of refusal to work
overtime, while not expressly protected by the Act, was an “economic
weapon” deployed as a function of the relative bargaining strength of
the union. The Commission’s regulation of that activity was thus a
substantive interference in the dispute that “would frustrate effective
implementation of the Act’s processes.”134 In other words, Congress
may have wanted no regulation of certain activities in order to let the
two sides duke it out. Where that is the case, Machinists preemption
applies.
The two types of federal labor law preemption are thus not as
distinct as they may first appear. Activities left unregulated to be
129

Id. at 133-35.
Id. at 135-36.
131
Id. at 138; see also Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 644
(1958).
132
Lodge 76, 427 U.S. at 138.
133
Id. (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960)).
134
Id. at 148 (quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394
U.S. 369, 379 (1969)).
130
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employed freely by the parties to a labor dispute could also be
considered activities implicitly protected by the broad language of § 7
of the Act.135
It is important to note an express exemption from preemption
strictures: namely, the exemption for trespass.136 This exemption is
part of a relatively narrow set of exemptions.137 The exemption for
trespass is a necessary result of Lechmere’s holding that the NLRA
could not be read as suborning trespass. In Radcliffe v. Rainbow Const.
Co., the Ninth Circuit held that Lechmere’s core holding that the
NLRA did not protect “reasonable trespass,” meant that neither
Garmon nor Machinists could preempt state trespassing laws.138
Circuits have described the narrowness of this exemption by
restricting it to trespass cases, for example, in O’Neil’s Market, where
the court stated that an easement owner is “debarred from actions
traditionally established for the protection of a possession, such as
trespass, writ of entry, and ejectment, because the easement owner
does not have the prerequisite possession.”139
Garmon and Machinists are vital doctrines that still greatly limit
the power of states to positively or incidentally control industrial
relations.

135

See supra note 129.
See e.g., 2003 A.L.R. FED. 1 (originally published in 2003) (an “employer
ordinarily may maintain a trespass action against the union without fear of
preemption by the National Labor Relations Act…pursuant to the Garmon doctrine,
even though the union's picketing is arguably prohibited or protected by federal
law.”).
137
See e.g., 2003 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (originally published in 2003).
138
Radcliffe v. Rainbow Const. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 784 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 545 (U.S. 2001) (“[W]hen a union's picketing activities trespass
on an employer's property, the employer ordinarily may maintain a trespass action
against the union; the trespass claim is not preempted even though the union's
picketing was arguably prohibited or protected by federal law…The property right
underlying the law of trespass, of course, is a matter of state law.”) (internal citation
omitted).
139
O’Neil’s Markets v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Meatcutters
Local 88, AFL-CIO, CLC 95 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 1996).
136
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A. Preemption Applied: Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown
In Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, the Court struck down
a California regulation that prohibited recipients of state grants, or
state business above $10,000, from assisting, promoting, or deterring
union organizing. The Court held that the rule was preempted by the
NLRA and Congress’ intent to leave expressive activity
unregulated.140 The policy posture contouring the Court’s holding was
Congress’ intent to maximize the free interplay of opposing forces in
labor-management expressive activities. Specifically, employer and
employee speech regarding unionization is conceptualized as a “zone”
Congress meant to keep free of state interference.141 The mere fact that
the state had a proprietary interest in the use of its funds was not
sufficient to outweigh Congress’s objective of keeping this “zone” free
and clear.142
Although the Court discusses the fact that the state’s purpose was
clearly to discourage recipients of state funds from actively opposing
unionization, the holding suggests that even if only the incidental (as
opposed to intentional) effect of the regulation was to interfere in this
competitive zone, it would be preempted. Citing Wisconsin Dept. of
Industry v. Gould, the Court suggested that wherever a state policy or
action created a “potential for conflict,” with the NLRA’s zoneclearing scheme, it could be preempted by the NLRA under
Machinists or Garmon.143 Brown is an important case because it
suggests that a “proprietary interest”—a “total or partial ownership” –
is not sufficient grounds to compromise the free interplay zone
contemplated by the NLRA and protected by the preemption doctrines.
Understanding the overarching considerations undergirding
preemption, and the operation of Machinists operation in particular,
140

Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 62-66 (2008).
Id. at 69.
142
Id. at 70.
143
Id. at 70 (citing Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282, 289
(1986)) (“Wisconsin's choice ‘to use its spending power rather than its police power
d[id] not significantly lessen the inherent potential for conflict’ between the state and
federal schemes; hence the statute was pre-empted.”).
141
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sheds light on the inapposite application of Lechmere in easement
cases.
IV. PREEMPTION OF STATE PROPERTY STATUTES AND CAUSES OF
ACTION THAT INCIDENTALLY REGULATE EXPRESSIVE
ACTIVITY
A. State Definition of Trespass
An employer’s showing of an injury to an easement is too
permissive and strays too far from Lechmere’s concern with suborning
trespass. A trespass occurs when one “enters land in the possession of
the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so…”144 Some
variant of this definition holds in each of the states in the Seventh
Circuit.145 It is thus generally the case that a trespass action will lie
only where there is a possessory interest that gives its holder an
absolute power to exclude. The grantor of an easement (in the relevant
context for this Comment, typically a lessor) may convey a possessory
interest in an easement coextensive with his own right to exclude, but
absent such an express granting, a trespass action by definition would
not lie.146
By illustration, the owner of a strip mall leases a building to a
retailer and grants to lessees in the terms of the lease an easement to
use the common areas (such as parking lots and berms). The lessees do
not possess these portions of the property as leaseholders—the
property owner (the grantor) possesses these portions of the strip mall.
A lease may of course explicitly grant lessees an easement which
gives them a right to exclude, though to do so would impliedly (and
paradoxically) permit one tenant to exclude the licensees and invitees
of another tenant, and vice versa.
144

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
See e.g., Miller Mut. Ins. Ass’n of Illinois v. Graham Oil Co., 668 N.E.2d
223 (2d Dist. 1996); Wendt v. Manegold Stone Co., 4 N.W.2d 134, 136 (1942); 23
IND. PRAC., PERSONAL INJURY LAW & PRACTICE § 3:29.
146
See generally, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN LAND § 1:28.
145
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B. State property common or positive law granting exclusionary
rights to nonexclusive easement holders should be preempted
by the NLRA insofar as they apply to § 7 activities.
If there is no chance that the employer could suffer a trespass,
Lechmere simply should not apply. That a state statute or state
common law gives easement-holders some cause of action for
interference or injury to those easements should not be germane to a
court’s review of a § 8(a)(1) charge against an employer for excluding
organizers. If the employer is not the owner of the property, and thus
lacks a cause of action for trespass, the sole inquiry should be whether
the express language of the easement (found typically in the lease)
gives them an exclusionary right coextensive with that of the
possessor. If they do not, then peaceable, truthful organizing conduct
should be protected by § 7.
In deciding the Roundy’s case, the Seventh Circuit missed an
opportunity to recognize the application of Chamber of Commerce v.
Brown and the NLRA preemption doctrines to reject the increasingly
deferential interpretation of Lechmere. Lechmere’s animating concern
is the destruction of property owners’ rights against trespass. That
concern would be satisfied by requiring employers to show a trespass
action would lie as a defense to an § 8(a)(1) charge for illegal
exclusion. Express language in a lease or other instrument that grants
an interest sufficient to exclude classes of persons from easements
would satisfy this requirement. A rightful Lechmere exclusion should
not otherwise be premised on state positive or common law defining
an easement holder’s right to exclude in a way that interferes with the
“zone” of free interplay between employers and employees.
In Roundy’s v. NLRB, the employer offered a state statute as a
defense to a § 8(a)(1) charge. The employer argued that the statute
created a cause of action for nonexclusive easement holders against
those who injure their use and enjoyment of the easement.147 The court
analyzed the statute and concluded that it did not create an
independent cause of action for those easement holders, but instead
147

Roundy’s v. NLRB, 674 F.3d 638, 651-52 (7th Cir. 2012).
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created a process for those instances where a cause of action exists
(presumably as a function of the interest granted by the easement).148
While the court’s approach rationally followed the trend in this line of
cases, it missed an opportunity to staunch the expansion of state
property law into the free and clear zone of expression contemplated
by the NLRA per the preemption doctrines.
It would have been appropriate for the court to reject the
employer’s theory outright on the grounds that any state statute that
created an independent cause of action for nonexclusive easement
holders to exclude peaceful § 7 organizers would be preempted to the
extent it applied to those organizers.149 The easements created by the
lease did not grant the employer a right to exclude any party from the
non-leased portions of the property—in other words it did not create
an interest coextensive with trespass rights. In such scenarios, the
language of the easement should be dispositive.
The concepts here are abstract enough to create some confusion, so
a concrete example may be helpful. Absent an express agreement
otherwise, an easement grants its holder only as much control as is
necessary to enjoy the terms of the easement. 150 Pursuant to its police
powers to define property rights, a state could in theory grant
lessees/easement holders a civil action to exclude those, other than the
easement grantor (the property owner), who interfere with their
preferred use of an easement—for example, as an alternative to having
to defer to, or request action from, the property owner.151
In such a scenario, the owner of a shopping mall may grant its
lessees an easement to non-leased portions of the property, such as
148

Id. at 652.
While this may seem recursive, it is important to state that such a statute
would not be preempted in its totality, as was the case with the statute in Brown,
unless it created an independent cause of action specifically against union
organizers.
150
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944) (“Thus, a person who has
a way over land has only such control of the land as is necessary to enable him to use
his way and has no such control as to enable him to exclude others from making any
use of the land which does not interfere with his.”).
151
For a discussion of the basic nature of easements, see THE LAW OF
EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN LAND § 1:28.
149
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parking lots. This grant would give the lessee an interest in those
portions of the property. So if the shopping mall lessee is bothered by
the RV owners who park in the lot, and the property owner is
unwilling or slow to remove them herself, the lessee could rely on the
state statute as grounds to eject the vacationers. Such a statute would
be perfectly permissible, and analogous to statutes that give tenants
particular rights vis a vis their landlords or outside parties.
However, was that statute used to exclude § 7 organizers it should
be preempted by the NLRA because its use would clutter up the free
zone Machinists preemption is meant to protect. Similarly, a common
law rule granting easement holders a right to exclude § 7 organizers,
absent an exclusive right to exclude in the language of the easement,
should be preempted for the same reason, insofar as it is applied to
those organizers.
The Seventh Circuit in Roundy’s considered the employer’s
argument that Wisconsin state courts recognized an easement holder’s
right to exclude those parties who “injure” their enjoyment of the
easement. But § 7 organizers peaceably engaged in non-intrusive,
truthful handbilling by definition are not injuring a non-exclusive
easement, which affords a right to its holder only to use of the
grantor’s property for a limited purpose, typically access for licensees
and invitees. Since the ingress and egress of customers and other
invitees is not compromised, no injury that doesn’t merely treat union
activity qua union activity as injurious takes place.
It is not a normative desire to alter Lechmere but application of
Machinists preemption via Chamber of Commerce v. Brown that
compels this new posture towards state property law in organizer
exclusion cases. In Brown, the Court clarified that Machinists
preemption creates “a zone free from all regulations, whether state or
federal.”152 While so doing, the Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
holding that employer speech was not a zone free from “all regulation”
because the NLRA regulates what employers may say in the run-up to
152

Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 at 74 (2008) (quoting
Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & Contractors
of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 226 (1993)).
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a workplace election for or against a union.153 The Court was
unimpressed with this bit of reasoning because Congress had clearly
“denied the [National Labor Relations Board] the authority to regulate
the broader category of noncoercive speech encompassed by [the
California statute]. It is equally obvious that the NLRA deprives
California of this authority,”154 because under preemption doctrines
the states have no more authority than the Board.155
It is a simple conclusion to reach then that noncoercive
employer/employee speech is a “free zone” that must remain free of
state regulation. No state law should interfere with this free zone.
Lechmere itself creates the outer bound of this preemption limit:
trespass. Except for actionable trespass, no state property law can be
used as a basis for ejecting otherwise peaceable § 7 organizers.
The proper inquiry where an easement is non-exclusive is solely a
fact inquiry into the conduct of the organizers. So long as the purposes
and details of the easement are not implicated by the handbilling, no
state court interpretation of the rights of easement holders should be
read to exclude § 7 organizers. In the Roundy’s case, the purpose of
the easement was access by customers to Roundy’s store and
reasonable use of common areas. Absent employee conduct that
prevented that, the proffered defense is preempted. Machinists
preemption contemplates keeping such organizing activities
unimpeded for the free interplay of opposing sides in labormanagement disputes. A mere easement-holder should not be able to
rely on that easement to avoid engaging in that interplay. Absent the
suborned trespass expressly prohibited by Lechmere, an easementholder employer must either show a trespass-level exclusionary
interest or face potential liability for an unlawful exclusion.

153

Id. at 74 (discussing why preemption should apply at all given the
Machinists requirement that area being regulated has not been regulated by
Congress).
154
Id.
155
Id. (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 751
(1985)).
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V. CONCLUSION
While inconsistent in terminology and methodology, the evolution
of jurisprudence surrounding the exclusion of § 7 organizers by
employers considered trespass to be the line § 7 could not breach.
Unfortunately, the discussion in Lechmere of an employer’s property
interest sparked a drift towards inquiry into state-defined property
laws to gauge the rights of union organizers. As is often the case with
long threads of case law, each small quantum of decision has
culminated over the years in a qualitative change. By the terms of
Lechmere itself however, courts should be concerned solely with the
possibility of trespass. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Roundy’s v.
NLRB came up short, despite ultimately arriving at the correct
conclusion through sound reasoning. The defenses raised by the
employer afforded an opportunity for the court to simplify the inquiry
in § 8(a)(1) organizer exclusion cases and remain faithful to Supreme
Court decisions and the intent of the NLRA. – but the court refused to
take that opportunity?
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